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We extend the model of Goyal and Joshi (2003) to involuntary spillovers. We assume that
the knowledge generated by a technological alliance generates spillovers aﬀecting a subset of
ﬁrms distinct from the allied, and we examine three modes of spillover dissemination. In the
benchmark case, spillovers aﬀect the whole population of ﬁrms. By contrast, in the two latter
spillovers spread through the network of alliances; they aﬀect either the direct neighborhoods
of the partners, or the whole component each partner is embedded in.
By introducing local spillovers, the proposed game contains both positive and negative ex-
ternalities. This enables us to examine non monotonic impacts of network characteristics
on proﬁtability of link formation. As a preliminary remark, we observe that when spillovers
disseminate globally, they have no particular inﬂuence on individual incentives to form al-
liances and the complete network emerges. Then, we test the spillovers’ spreading through
the network of alliances. This entails the formation of networks with moderate asymmetry
and under-connected with regard to social welfare. When spillovers spread toward the direct
neighborhood of the allied, we notably isolate a class of graphs containing a unique incomplete
component. When spillovers spread in the whole component of the allied, the possible stable
architectures are reduced to the union of complete components of distinct size; furthermore
the size of stable components satisﬁes a non-monotonic relationship with respect to spillovers
intensity.
This paper can be inserted in the literature on strategic cooperation. Beyond the fact
our model extends Goyal and Joshi (2003)’s seminal work, the moderate level of asymmetry
in the stable networks shall be compared with Calvo-Armengol (2004); This work provides a
qualitatively similar conclusion in a model of job search, in which individual payoﬀs exhibit
increasing return in own links and decreasing return in the partners’ links. Second, the
emergence of asymmetric and complete components (in the case spillovers aﬀect the whole
component of the partners) shall be compared with Bloch (1995). With respect to this work,
a rather similar mechanism applies: the incitation to refuse a connection increases with
the diﬀerence between the partner’s and own component size. But, there is also a major
diﬀerence: in our context small components (typically whose cardinal is less than half the
population) may not coalesce. Further, the non-monotonicity of the set of stable networks
2with respect to spillovers’ intensity is intrinsic to our context.
Section 2 presents the model, section 3 the results. The last section is an appendix
providing all proofs.
2 The model
We consider an industry containing a set N = {1,...,n} of ﬁrms. We set up a standard
two-periods game in which the ﬁrst is devoted to the formation of cost-reducing alliances and
the second to competition. For this purpose, we propose a spillover-augmented version of the
game initiated by Goyal and Joshi (2003).
Graphs. We denote [·] as the ﬂoor operator and | · | means the cardinal of a set. A non
directed graph represents the ﬁrms (the nodes) plus the set of bilateral alliances between the
ﬁrms (the edges between nodes). We denote by G the set of all non directed graphs with n
nodes. We shall abuse the notation by writing that some link ij ∈ g. We denote by Ni(g)
the set of agents with whom agent i forms a link in the graph g (agent i is not included
in the set by convention) and µi(g) represents the cardinal of this set. We need to deﬁne
vij(g) = |Ni(g)∩Nj(g)|, vij(g) ∈ {0,··· ,n−2}, representing the number of common partners
of agents i and j in the graph g.
Symbol g − ij (resp. g + ij) shall denote the graph g less (resp. plus) the link ij. The
subgraph A(g) of a graph g is the graph containing agents in A(g) plus all links involving in
the graph g the pairs of agent in A(g). A complete subgraph is a subgraph such that every
pair of agents in the subgraph forms a link. A path in the graph g is a sequence of nodes
{a0,··· ,ap} such that aiai+1 ∈ g for all i ∈ {0,...,p − 1}. A component C(g) in the graph
g is a subgraph such that there is a path between any pair of agents in the component, and
there is no link in the graph g between any agent inside the component and any agent outside
the component. We shall denote i ∈ C(g) when agent i belongs to component C(g). Finally,
L(C(g)) will represent the set of links in the component C(g). For clarity and when there
are no confusions, we shall omit the argument g from the main symbols: µ, C, A.
Technologies and spillovers. We assume positive marginal cost and no ﬁxed cost. Indi-
vidual marginal costs are decreasing functions ci(µi(g)) in the number of alliances in which
ﬁrms are involved. The function is assumed to be linear with slope −γ (linearity is crucial for
3obtaining uniqueness of stable networks). Involuntary spillovers may arise in the industry.
When ﬁrms i and j engage in a common R&D eﬀort, other ﬁrms beneﬁt from marginal cost
reduction, by the amount ρ ∈ [0,γ]. We denote by τ the ratio
ρ
γ. When spillovers spread in
the whole population (resp. a strict subset), we shall talk about global (resp. local) spillovers.
The two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms simultaneously raise collaborative links.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that forming links is non costly. We apply the
standard stability criterion of pairwise stability, adapted from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996):
(i) for ij ∈ g, πi(g) > πi(g − ij) and πj(g) > πj(g − ij), (ii) for ij / ∈ g, if πi(g + ij) > πi(g),
then πj(g+ij) ≤ πj(g). Once alliances are formed, ﬁrms compete with each other in order to
maximize individual proﬁts. Given a network g, we denote by πi(g) the proﬁt made by ﬁrm i
on this network. In that speciﬁc case, each ﬁrm produces some homogenous good, sold at price
pi and in quantity qi. The linear inverse demand schedule is given by pi = α−qi−
P
j6=i qj in
the region where the price is positive, with α > 0 measuring the absolute size of the market.
Network architectures. The empty (resp. complete, denoted gc) network is the graph such
that no pair (resp. every pair) of agents forms a link. The class gk, with k ∈ {n
2 +1,··· ,n−1}
if n is even and with k ∈ {n−1
2 + 1,··· ,n − 1} if n is odd, denotes a network containing two
complete components, the greatest being of size k. We also present networks with incomplete
components. We ﬁrst remark that a network g can always be decomposed as follows: partition
g into a set of disjoint complete subgraphs A1(g),··· ,Ap(g) such that
P
i≤p |Ai| = n. This set
is said minimal when there is no partition with less elements. Then we can build the graph g
as considering the collection {Ai}i∈{1,···,p} and completing the residual links between the sets.
When possible and for convenience, we shall abuse the notation by writing g = {Ai}i∈{1,···,p}
(the notation gives no precision about the links between agents in distinct subgraphs). We
denote by Γ(q,α) the component architecture such that (i) it contains (α+1)q agents, α ≥ 2
being an integer, (ii) the component is minimally partitioned into two distinct complete
subgraphs {A1,A2} with |A2| = q ≥ 2, (iii) µk = (α+1)q−2 for any k ∈ A1 (so agents in A1
have q − 1 partners in A2), (iv) µi = (α + 1)(q − 1) for any i ∈ A2. Note that every agent in
any complete subgraph has the same number of partners, whereas two agents in two distinct
complete subgraphs do not. Hence, the component Γ(q,α) contains two complete subgraphs
and every agent in the greatest complete subgraph forms connections with all agents less
one in the smallest complete subgraph. Further, the organization of links between the two
4subgraphs is such that any two agents in a given complete subgraph have the same number
of partners (see ﬁgure 1).
Figure 1: n = 6; the network architecture Γ(2,2)
We generalize this class to r ≥ 2 complete subgraphs as follows: we denote by the class
Γ(q,α1,··· ,αr−1) the component architecture, containing (
Pr−1
i=1 αi + 1)q agents, minimally
partitioned into r complete subgraphs {Ai}i=1,···,r, with |Ar| = q, |Ai| = αi|Ai+1|, αi ≥ 2
being an integer, and such that:

   
   
for all j ∈ {1,··· ,r}, for all i,i0 ∈ Aj, ii0 ∈ g and µi = µi0
for all i,j,i < j, ∀k ∈ Ai, |Nk(g) ∩ Aj| = |Aj| − 1
for all i,j such that µj < µi and ij / ∈ g, then vij = µj
Notably, considering two agents in two distinct complete subgraphs, the agent in the largest
subgraph forms a link with all agents less one in the other subgraph; also, for any pair of
agents with diﬀerent number of partners and not forming a link, the set of partners of the
less connected agent belongs to the set of partners of the other agent. To ﬁnish, we denote
by Γ0(q,α1,··· ,αr−1) the class of graphs with n = (1 +
Pr−1
i=1 αi)q + 1 agents and consisting
in the union of one isolated agent and one component Γ(q,α1,··· ,αr−1).
3 Results
We examine the stability of strategic networks when spillovers disseminate through the graph
of alliances. Beforehand, we present the benchmark case where each new alliance aﬀects the
marginal costs of the whole population of agents, i.e. generates global spillovers.
53.1 Global spillovers
A well-known property of the Cournot oligopoly with linear demand (see Yi [1998]) states that
a simultaneous symmetric (favorable) shock on all marginal costs induces positive individual
quantity variations in Cournot equilibrium. Then basically:
Result 3.1 Under global spillovers, the complete network is uniquely stable.
(Proof omitted as resulting from Yi [1998])
3.2 Neighbor-restricted spillovers
In this case, the marginal cost of agent i in the graph g writes:






Proposition 3.1 Suppose that spillovers are neighbor-restricted. Then, the set of possibly
stable architectures is reduced to the complete network, the network gn−1, and some networks
in the classes Γ(α1,··· ,αr−1) and Γ0(α1,··· ,αr−1), r ≥ 2. Furthermore,
(i) {gc} is stable for any τ ∈ [0,1],





(iii) the class {Γ(q,α)} is stable for any τ ≥ n−1
n−3+α,







(iv) other stable networks exist in the classes Γ({αi}i=1,···,r−1) and Γ0({αi}i=1,···,r−1), r ≥ 3
(under conditions given in the proof).
Let us present a stable incomplete network g with 3 minimally complete subgraphs deﬁned
as follows: g = {A1,A2,A3}, with |A1| = α|A2| = αβ|A3| (α,β ≥ 2 and integers), |A3| ≥ 2.
By deﬁnition, µk = n−3 for all k ∈ A1, µj = n−α −2 for all j ∈ A2, µi = n−(α +1)β −1






. Hence, if α = 2, the
graph is always instable; if α = 3, the graph is stable for τ = 1; if α ≥ 4, the graph is stable
for any τ ≥ n−1
n−4+α as soon as β ≥ 3α−1
α+1 .
Remark 3.1.1. In the case n = 3, if g0 denotes the graph with one link, S = {gc} for
any τ ∈ [0,1[ and S = {gc,g0} when τ = 1. If n ∈ {4,5}, S = {gc} for any τ ∈ [0,1]. If
6n = 6, denote ˜ g as the graph depicted in the ﬁgure 1. Then S = {gc} for any τ ∈ [0,1[ and
S = {gc, ˜ g} as τ = 1.
Remark 3.1.2. Some moderate level of asymmetry applies. For instance, the following claim
indicates that an incomplete component does not contain one agent that would be linked to
all other agents:
Claim 3.1 Suppose that n ≥ 3 and that a stable graph g contains one incomplete component
C. Then, no agent in the component has |C| − 1 partners.
This moderate asymmetry mainly stems from two properties possessed by stable networks:
(P1) Suppose that a stable graph g contains one incomplete component C. Then for every
pair of agents (i,j) in the component C such that the link ij / ∈ g, µi 6= µj.
(P2) A stable graph g with ik / ∈ g and µk > µi must satisfy vik = µi.
By property (P1) if two agents do not form a connection, they do not have the same number
of partners. Property (P2) states that if two agents who do not form a link in a stable graph
have a distinct number of partners, then all the partners of the agent having the least number
of partners are also partners of the other. The former property favors asymmetric networks,
whereas the latter ensures some minimal overlapping between asymmetrically positioned
agents.
Remark 3.1.3. When the inverse demand is concave, a major implication is that the
condition of link formation proﬁtability becomes dependent on equilibrium quantities2.
Remark 3.1.4. The set eﬃcient networks, deﬁned as the sum of aggregate surplus and
consumer surplus, is reduced to the complete network. The proof is formally identical to
Goyal and Joshi (2003, 2004). Indeed, one just have to recall that ci(g) > ci(gc) whenever
g 6= gc; for that, note that, in the complete network, for each agent the number of direct
alliances as well as partners’ partners are maximized. Hence, part of stable networks are
under-connected with respect to social welfare.
2Indeed, straightforward comparative statics at equilibrium indicate that (i) when P
0(Q) is decreasing then



















n iﬀ qi >
Q
n+1 (assuming R > 0). A link is proﬁtable for the






τ + µj − vij

.
Hence, the greater the equilibrium quantity qi, the smaller agent i ’s incentive to form a new link.
73.3 Component-restricted spillovers
In this case, the marginal cost of agent i in the graph g writes:








Another form of moderate asymmetry is detected.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that spillovers are component-restricted. Then:
(i) stable networks are the union of complete components of distinct size,
(ii) the incentive of link formation in a given complete component is non-monotonic (decreas-
ing then increasing) with respect to the size of the partner’s component.
The ﬁgure 2 illustrates the non-monotonicity of the result. The curve describes the critical
values τk associated with each graph gk in the case n = 17. For a given value of k, the graph
gk is stable if τ ≥ τk.
Figure 2: Non monotonicity of stable graphs gk with respect to τ; X-axis=k, Y-axis=τk
This result is easily interpreted. When considering two agents in two distinct complete
components, the agent in the greatest one is the less interested by the alliance. When her
potential partner is in a very small component, her incentive to form a link decreases with
the size of the partner’s component since more agents shall receive spillovers from her own
component. On the opposite, when the size of the partner’s component is suﬃciently large,
she can expect receiving a more substantial amount of spillovers from the other component,
which ﬁnishes to dominate the negative incentive.
Remark 3.2.1. Examples of stable graphs with 3 complete components: the smallest popu-
lation size entailing stability of three components for τ = 1 is n = 10 and the triplet (1,4,5)
8is stable (each number in the triplet denotes the size of a complete component). To ﬁnd a
stable network with four components we must reach the size n = 55, and we ﬁnd (1,10,19,25)
as being stable. Five stable components requires to go around n = 2000. For instance, the
network (1,63,324,659,953) is easily seen to be stable (see the end of the appendix for an
illustration of how checking that a network containing complete components is stable).
Remark 3.2.2. Two components of size less than n
2 may not coalesce (if their sizes are
suﬃciently diﬀerent, the agent in the largest component shall not ﬁnd the link proﬁtable -
see in the appendix the lemma 4.3 and the illustration given after the proof of the proposition
3.2).
Remark 3.2.3. The proposition also applies for smoothly concave inverse-demand function.
Furthermore, like in the preceding subsection, ‘convexiﬁcation’ of demand makes proﬁtability
depend on quantities3.
Remark 3.2.4. Like in the preceding subsection, the unique eﬃcient network is the complete
network.
4 Appendix
Proof of proposition 3.1.
Proﬁtability of link formation: in homogenous Cournot oligopoly with linear demand,




n+1 . Consider a non complete graph g
and one link ij / ∈ g. Then, the equilibrium quantity in the graph g + ij writes:
qi(g+ij) =
α − n(ci(g) − γ − ρ(µj − vij)) + cj(g) − γ − ρ(µi − vij) +
P
k6=i,j ck − ρ(µi(g) + µj(g) − vij)
n + 1
3Hence, a link is proﬁtable for the two involved agents i,j whenever ζi < fi(ζj) and ζj < fj(ζi), with



























− 2(n − 2)

When Hi increases, the function increases so that the unique positive root of f(x) − x increases. As a
consequence, when the inverse-demand function is concave, if qi < qj <
Q
n+1, then Hi < Hj <
1
n and the
condition of link formation proﬁtability is more restrictive than under linear demand; when qi > qj >
Q
n+1,
then Hi > Hj >
1
n and the condition is less restrictive; when qi <
Q
n+1 < qj, then Hi <
1
n < Hj and the
condition is more (resp. less) restrictive for agent i (resp. agent j).
9so that:






(µj − vij) +
µj
2
The link is formed if this relation is true simultaneously for agents i and j (substituting
labels i and j in this above inequality). Denote fτ(µj,vij) = n−1
2τ + n−2
2 (µj − vij) +
µj
2 . We
note that fτ is decreasing w.r.t. both parameter τ and argument vij. Hence, the condition
under which the link formation is proﬁtable is more restrictive when τ and vij attain their
maximum value.
Thus, points (i) and (ii) of the proposition are checked directly by direct inspection. Con-
cerning the points (iii), (iii’) and (iv), we need ﬁrst to use the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1 A stable network contains either one component or two components with one
being an isolated agent.
Proof. Suppose that a stable network g contains two components. Consider two agents i







Note that if µj ≥ 1 the condition is automatically satisﬁed. Then a stable network with two
components contains at most one isolated agent. To ﬁnish, check that two distinct isolated
agents have an incentive to form a link. 
The lemma strongly restricts the set of stable architectures. Second, we focus on stable net-
works with incomplete components and show uniqueness of the classes Γ and Γ0, by remarking
two properties:
Property (P1) Suppose that a stable graph g contains one incomplete component C. Then
for every pair of agents (i,j) in the component C such that the link ij / ∈ g, µi 6= µj.
Proof. Suppose that µi = µj = µ and that the link ij is not proﬁtable. The required





2 , that is n − 1 ≤ (n − 2)vij − (n − 3)µ. The
right hand side is increasing in vij and in the case vij = µ, we obtain n − 1 ≤ µ, which is
impossible. 
Property (P2) A stable graph g with ik / ∈ g and µk > µi must satisfy vik = µi.




2 (µi − vik). If µi − vik ≥ 1, this is impossible for
all admissible value of τ. 
10Properties (P1) and (P2) jointly ensure that some incomplete component in a stable network
belongs to the class Γ(q,α1,··· ,αr−1).
Point (iii):
Lemma 4.2 Suppose that a stable graph contains one component C, with C minimally par-
titioned into two complete subgraphs A1,A2, and |A2| = q < |A1|. Then, (i) if
n−q
q is not an
integer the graph is instable, (ii) if n − q = αq, α being an integer, then the component is in




q is not an integer, then it is not possible to get property (P1). Indeed,
from (P1) it stems that if two distinct agents in a stable graph g have the same number of
links, then they form a link in g. This leads to the building up of complete subgroups of
agents having all the same number of partners. Hence, if the component C is incomplete, the
component can be minimally partitioned into at least two complete subgraphs. We suppose
here that there are two minimally complete subgraphs. If agents in Ai have the same number
of partners, this means that they have the same number of partners outside Ai. But this is
not possible to ﬁx
|A1|
|A2| as not integer and to have that any agent in A2 has the same number
of partners in A1.
(ii) the result basically follows from property (P2). Indeed, as A2 is a complete subgraph,
the property implies that any agent in A1 has q − 1 partners in A2. The conditions for
stability of the class is the following. Given that |A2| = q and |A1| = αq, µk = n − 2 for
all k ∈ A1 and µj = (1 + α)(q − 1) for all j ∈ A2. Since vik = µi, forming the link is not
proﬁtable to agent k if τ ≥ n−1
n−3+α. Hence the constraints deﬁne exactly the class Γ(q,α). 
Point (iii’): for the class Γ0(q,α) to be stable, we need more. Consider agent j ∈ A2, k ∈ A1
(where A1 and A2 are the two subgraphs of the component Γ) and denote by l the isolated
agent. In addition to the conditions of the lemma just above, if agent j has not interest
to form the link jl, then the graph is stable (µj < µk so the constraint on the link jl is
stronger than the constraint on the link kl). But agent j has not interest to form the link jl
if µj ≥ n−1
2τ . Replacing µj by its value (q − 1)(1 + α) and noting that n − 1 = q(α + 1) this
entails τ ≥
q
2(q−1) (Note that, given that n − 1 = (α + 1)q, n−1
n−3+α <
q
2(q−1) iﬀ q < 3α
α+1).
11Point (iv):
Lemma 4.3 Suppose that a stable graph contains one component C, with C minimally par-
titioned into r complete subgraphs A1,··· ,Ar, and |Ai| = αi|Ai+1|. Then the stable graphs
are built as follows: (i) Ai is a complete subgraph, (ii) for all (i,j) ∈ Ai × Aj, j > i, then
agent i forms a link with |Aj| − 1 agents in Aj, (iii) for all (i,j) ∈ Ai × Aj, j > i, then






(The proof is omitted, replicating directly the above one - using properties P1 and P2.) The
point (iv) follows directly: the class Γ(q,α1,··· ,αr−1) is stable under the requirement on
τ given in the lemma; the stability of the class Γ0(q,α1,··· ,αr−1) requires the additional
condition τ ≥
q
2(q−1). To ﬁnish, uniqueness is ensured by recalling to mind the lemma 4.1. 
Proof of the claim 3.1. Consider a stable graph g with an incomplete component; consider,
in this component, three agents i, j and k such that ij ∈ g, ik / ∈ g and without loss µk > µi.














vik(g) ≤ µi, this is not possible. 
Proof of proposition 3.2. Point (i):
In a stable graph, components are complete; stability of the complete network: consider
a non complete graph g and suppose that there exists a component containing two agents i
and j such that ij / ∈ g. Then we see immediately that these two agents have an incentive to
form a link. Indeed, we are replaced in a game similar to the case of global spillovers, since
forming a link induces spillovers to the other agents of the component, but agent i (resp.
agent j) does not receive spillovers from agent j’s component (resp. agent i’s component) as
they already belong to the same one. Hence, following Yi (1998), it basically stems that the
component is complete. Further, we deduce that the complete network is stable for all values
of τ ∈ [0,1].
Proﬁtability of link formation between two distinct complete components: consider a net-
work g containing two distinct complete components, and two agents i and j taken from
two distinct components. Let us denote the size of (resp. the number of links in) agent i’s
12component as ζi (resp. Li). We compute the equilibrium quantity variation of agent i when
the alliance ij is formed as follows:
qi(g + ij) − qi(g) =
n(γ + ρLj) − (γ + ρLi) − (ζi − 1)ρ(Lj + 1) − (ζj − 1)ρ(Li + 1)
n + 1
That is, as replacing L by
ζ(ζ−1)
2 :
















This order-2 polynomial admits two roots of opposite sign. Hence, it is proﬁtable for both
agents i and j to form an alliance with each other when ζi < f(ζj) and ζj < f(ζi), with




















In a stable graph, two components cannot have equal size: we know from the above analysis
that in stable networks components are complete. Consider two agents i and j of distinct
complete components with equal size ζ. From above we note that the link is proﬁtable iﬀ
ζ < fτ(ζ), i.e. −2ζ3 + (n + 3)ζ2 − (n + 5)ζ +
2(n−1)
τ + 4 > 0. We deﬁne the function
gτ(x) = −2x3 + (n + 3)x2 − (n + 5)x +
2(n−1)
τ + 4, for x ∈ {1,··· , n
2} if n is even and for
x ∈ {1,··· , n−1
2 } if n is odd. First we observe that for all values of x, gτ(x) is decreasing with
parameter τ. So, in order to show that the function is positive for all x ≤ n
2, it is suﬃcient
to consider the case τ = 1. We easily see that g1(0) > 0, g1(+∞) = −∞, g0
1(0) < 0 and
g00
1(x) ≤ 0 ⇔ x ≥ n+3
6 when x > 0. We deduce that this order-3 polynomial g1(.) admits a
unique positive root, and the polynomial is positive (resp. negative) for any positive value of
x smaller (resp. greater) than this root. To ﬁnish, we see that for n even, g1(n
2) > 0 and for n
odd, g1(n+1
2 ) > 0. If n is even, g1(n
2) = n2−2n+8
4 , which is positive. If n is odd, g1(n+1
2 ) = 0.
Hence, the root is beyond half of the population. This means that two agents belonging to
two distinct complete components of equal size have always an incentive to form a link.
Point (ii): let us deﬁne the function hτ(x,y) =
2(n−1)
τ +(n+1)y(y−1)−(xy+2)(x+y−2),





For any τ ∈ [0,1], note that (1) if 1 ≤ y < x, hτ(x,y) < hτ(y,x): the agent in the greatest
complete component has always less incentive to form a link than the other. (2) ∀x > 0,
hτ(x + 1,y) < hτ(x,y): when the size of the complete component of some agent increases,
the agent has less incentive to form a link with some agent in a component of ﬁxed size. (3)
13hτ(x,y + 1) − hτ(x,y) > 0 iﬀ y > x2−x+2
2(n+1−x): the incentive of link formation of some agent in
a given complete component is non-monotonic (decreasing then increasing) with respect to
the size of the partner’s component. 
Let us say more concerning bounds on the sizes of stable components: the solution x∗
τ of the
equation x = fτ(x) is also the root of gτ(x), which has been seen to be greater than half the
population. From the following basic lemma we will deduce that for two distinct components
to be stable the diﬀerence in their size must be large enough:
Lemma 4.4 Consider a function t with real argument in [1,+∞), such that t is continuous,
diﬀerentiable with continuous derivative, strictly increasing, t(x) = x admits a unique solution
x∗ and t0(x∗) < 1. Then, (i) for any y > x∗, if x < t(y), then y > t(x), (ii) for any
y ∈]t(1),x∗[, there exists t−1(y) > 0 such that for all x ∈]t−1(y),y[ (resp. x < t−1(y)), then
x < t(y) and y < t(x) (resp. x < t(y) and y > t(x)).
The function f1 deﬁned above is increasing and satisﬁes the conditions of the lemma. Part
(i) entails that one does not have simultaneously ζi < f1(ζj) and ζj < f1(ζi) as soon as
max(ζi,ζj) > x∗
1. Part (ii) implies that two distinct components of size less than x∗
1 may
coexist in a stable graph if their sizes are not too much close. Note that, when τ increases
the constraint is relaxed, so that whatever τa < τb, whatever stable graph ga for τa there
exists a stable graph gb for τb such that ga is a subgraph of gb (even if function f does not
satisﬁes the conditions of the lemma for τ < 1). This means that any stable network for τ < 1
is also a union of complete components. We give a simple illustration of how checking that a
network composed of complete components is or is not stable, in the case n = 10 and τ = 1
(this is the minimum network size generating a stable union of three complete components):
Table 1: n = 10, τ = 1
The left-hand table represents, for two components of size y and x, y ≤ x, the maximum
size x∗
1(y) below which two agents belonging to the respective components ﬁnd proﬁtable
14to form a link. The condition examines the link formation proﬁtability of the agent in the
greatest component -the less incited-; for instance the line y = 3,x∗
1(3) = 4.4 should be
interpreted as ‘an agent in a component of size 4 (resp. 5 or more) ﬁnds proﬁtable (resp. not
proﬁtable) to form a link with some agent in a component of size 3’. This makes possible
to determine which potential link would be proﬁtable for both parties, as summarized in the
right-hand table: coordinates represent component sizes, with the convention that the size
x is on the X-axis and the size y (≤ x) on the Y-axis; when the link is proﬁtable (resp.
not proﬁtable) to both partners, the word ‘unstable’ (resp. ‘stable’) is used. We check
that S = {(1,4,5),g6,g7,g8,g9,gc}, where (1,4,5) denotes the network composed of three
complete components of size 1, 4 and 5.
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